This paper explores critical aspects of the agency of youngsters in situations of crisis. Throughout the political-military conflict in Côte d" Ivoire (2002Ivoire ( -2011, the patriotic militias were the locus of extensive networking and, to the extent that this was informed by political or ideological choices, vast enterprises of civil society building. In this paper, I focus on the performative and social dimension of youth militia activity: (a) the sustained attempts by youngsters to insinuate themselves into the armed forces by "impersonation", and (b) the wider and often intricate processes of networking and hierarchism within which these persistent pursuits of social mobility took place. Rather than to capture the wider transformations triggered by these processes in narrow analytical concepts such as "brutalisation" and "militianisation", this paper considers them to be the contingent outcome of competencies, mobility, and creativity of youngsters whose performative, social, and physical trajectories transform public life. This paper thus seeks to make the point that the long post-war (post-2002), or rather pre-peace, multiplication of militias and their growing impact on social and political life, constituted a protracted, multifaceted and multisited process which we can productively begin to disentangle in terms of social mobility albeit of a juvenile and subaltern kind.
Introduction
This paper addresses the issue of social mobility of the youth whose condition has at times been described in terms of hyper-mobility or extreme immobility, verging on "social death" (Vigh, 2006) . Particularly in the contexts in which these apparent opposite conditions have been observed -those of heavy societal turbulence sometimes accompanied by widespread violence (Arnaut and Højbjerg, 2008 ) -the saying applies that "the extremes meet". Both predicaments imply a lack of enabling attachments provoking extreme rootlessness hence making youngsters "mobilisable" or exploitable for different sorts of mostly violent enterprises , or leading to extreme "stuckness" and isolation which youngsters try to overcome by grasping the opportunities offered by war and turmoil (Vigh, 2006) . Taking its lead from these insights, this paper wishes to extend the focus beyond the immediate violent context by exploring the longer term goals and aspirations of the youngsters under consideration (Raeymaekers, 2011 , Argenti, 2007 , Diouf, 2003 , Hall and Jefferson, 2006 (1993 ).
Several successful attempts have been made to take into account pre-and/or post-conflict continuities. Hoffman (2007b: 640) , for one, stressed the socialisation processes that preceded militia-formation by documenting how the erstwhile Sierra Leonean "militia" Civil Defence Forces was the product of "the militarisation of a web of social relations". Another attempt in that respect is Utas" (2005) who followed these changing relations into the post-conflict era; but more importantly for our present purposes, he looked at how wartime structures and competencies were being transferred into peace-time Liberia, in the field of democratic politics (Christensen and Utas, 2008 , but see also : Hoffman, 2007a : Hoffman, , 2011 .
In a similar vein, the present paper looks at social networking and professional advancement, in other words at life-making projects (Raeymaekers, forthcoming) , which youngsters seek to realise under the guise of military action. Considerable insight has been gained by looking into processes of "militianisation" or the capturing of youth constituencies in the proliferation of militias (Banégas, 2008 , Ngodi, 2006 . However, within the on-going quest to strike the right balance on youth agency (Honwana, 2000 , Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004 , Vigh, 2009 , Utas and Jörgel, 2008 , "militianisation" could be argued to unduly stress youth"s instrumentalisation and preclude any consideration of social mobility. In order not to fall into the other extreme (Raeymaekers, s.d.) , this paper suggests a triple movement.
The first move operates a reversal of agency and tries to discern in the narratives of the militia members, attempts to insinuate themselves into on-going processes of militianisation for purposes of professional and social advancement. The second move consists in documenting the deployment of this agency which, unsurprisingly, is of a largely tactical nature that can best be described in de Certeaunian terms of "détournement" or "misuse" (De Certeau, 1984) . Finally, the third move is a theoretical one in that it tries to reconceptualise youth agency in these contexts as spatial and embodied performance. The turmoil of crisis, it is argued, elicits border transgressions of different kinds or, stated otherwise, opens transgressive spaces in which youth can occupy aspired positions by enactment. The kind of enactment which I call here impersonation combines mimicry with aspiration and heralds the insinuation of youngsters in particular fields (security, politics, etc.) . The impersonation anticipates social mobility in the post-conflict era and can, occasionally, be the basis of societal innovation.
More concretely, this paper addresses the recent conflict in Côte d"Ivoire since the insurgency of (see: McGovern, 2011 . First it looks at the process of massive mobilisation into the different pro-presidential militias (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2011) . This, I argue, was to some extent propelled by the expectation of youngsters that joining the militia meant approaching the regular defence and security forces -'the dressed-up corps' or le corps habillé -and eventually joining it.
What followed for most of the militia members was a short but dreadful decade of trying to cling on, and keep mobilised, or at least of staying connected with military or political entrepreneurs or "big men" who could remobilise them in time to join one reintegration programme or another into the regular defence and security forces. The subaltern tactics of the destitute militia members was one of discursive and performative perfection (speak/act like the military) and networking (into groupings of variable size and formality called gbôhi). The resulting mobility can best be described as "going in circles": circulation without penetration and apprenticeship without full mastery, impersonation without nomination. However, it is still early days to perceive what longterm effects these "movements" will have, both on the life projects and aspirations of the youngsters in question and on the societal fields in which they have been deploying their truncated experiences and competencies.
Although the present paper is based on approximately 110 formal and informal interviews with a total of 74 interlocutors during four spells of fieldwork between March 2008 and March 2010, its narrative gives ample attention to the lives of two special interlocutors: the late Ato Belly and "Marcus Garvey". During the post-electoral crisis of November 2010 to May 2011, I kept in touch with them (as well as with 17 others) mostly by telephone. This story begins with the last telephone conversation I had with Ato Belly to whom this paper is dedicated.
Final redress
The last time I spoke to "General" Ato Belly was on Thursday 31st March 2011. It was the first night of the battle for Abidjan between armed forces defending the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and those dedicated to instate the elected president Alassane Ouattara. 4 This battle heralded the tragic finale of the post-electoral crisis which took a decisive turn with the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo, ten days later. The pro-Ouattara offensive was carried both from the rebel-held Euro) demobilisation fee promised to every formally demobilised militia member, was never disbursed by the Gbagbo administration. This was all too grave for Ato who not only needed this money for his young family -living in a ramshackle house with a 10-month old disabled daughter -but also for the hundreds of youngsters of his gbôhi who kept on hassling him for financial support or urging him to raise the matter of this broken promise among the militia leadership and its patrons in presidential circles. But against all odds, Thursday 31st March offered the occasion for ultimate redress.
During our last telephone conversation, Ato explained that he was rigged out in a complete battle dress, put together from among the uniforms, boots, berets, and belts, left behind by the many FDS who had abandoned the RTI premises. He had even succeeded, he added, in procuring a number of shoulder marks (galons) which he would sew on later. Also, he had an impressive amount of weapons at his disposal: Kalashnikovs in great numbers as well as anti-tank RPG-7 grenade launchers. Finally, Ato did not miss the occasion to point out that all this took place in the presence, and with the support of Gbagbo's finest and manifestly bravest army unit, the Republican Guards (Gardes Républicaines). They made this sudden transformation 'real':
vouching for his soldiery value, turning his hasty dressing-up into an official act of instantaneous conscription, and converting his seized weaponry and insignia into bestowals complementing his last-ditch, "well deserved" career move.
Militias and pre-peace networking
The above section recounts one of the many tragic micro-moments in With a few notable exceptions, the operations in which the patriotic self-defence groups participated were of limited military significance. Ironic perhaps but quite typical for the Ivorian situation, militia organisations were mostly established in the aftermath of the early decisive combats in the west (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2010 Hamer, , 2011 , and in anticipation of post-war registration and so-called communal reinsertion programmes, which began to materialise in a haphazard way from 2009 onwards. Throughout this period many remained mobilised or kept in contact with their units and commanders while attending to other activities. As we will see in more detail below, throughout the short decade of political-military conflict (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , the patriotic militias were the locus of extensive networking and to the extent that this was informed by political or ideological choices, became vast enterprises of civil society building. On the latter dimension of militia-formation I have written elsewhere (Arnaut, 2008b (Arnaut, , 2008c . In this paper, I focus more on its social dimension: the intricate processes of networking. After all, the post-war, or rather, prepeace multiplication of militias and their growing impact on social and political life, was a protracted, multifaceted and multi-sited process, which this paper tries to begin to disentangle in terms of social mobility of a juvenile and subaltern kind.
Military triangulations
The dynamics of expansion, dissemination, and mobility of militias in southern Côte d'Ivoire during the preceding decade had at least three dimensions to it: (a) the flexibility of militia members as related to their resourcefulness and entrepreneurship, (b) the changeability of militia structures within strategies of clientelism and low-key elite formation, and (c) proximity to regular defence and security forces. Much later, in mid-2007, Ato made another successful attempt to accommodate several hundred militiamen who were out on the streets of Abidjan after having been chased from their camps and from the police and gendarme barracks in which they had been housed for several months. This time around, Ato chose the deserted run-down hotel Akwaba along the Abidjan beach as his selfstyled "naval" base -located in Vridi, the neighbourhood where Ato was raised and spent most of his life. According to Ato, his sustained attempts to muster and accommodate his ex-combatants were meant to keep up the latter's public visibility in anticipation of announced demobilisation and reinsertion schemes. However, as we will see presently, given the inveterate uncertainty of these programmes, militiamen also bet on other horses.
Both from the Akwaba "naval" base (until it was dismantled in November 2008) and, even more so, from the above-mentioned First BCL camp in Adjamé, Ato observed and supported the to and fro movements of 'his' troops. On an individual basis or in groups of variable size (also called gbôhi) combatants were seizing all sorts of opportunities to valorise their 'violent labour' (Hoffman, 2011) to mark his senior position as a militia paramount chief among the many militia "generals", he labelled himself "marshal" (Arnaut, 2006). 8 Further to this point, it is significant that the GPP, the self-declared "mother of all patriotic militias", is itself the offshoot of an earlier patriotic organisation, the UPLTCI ( In order to illustrate how the above processes were also at work in other militias, but above all, in order to introduce the aspect of the proximity of corps habillés as the third factor of militia dynamics, I introduce another character, a militia member called 'Marcus Garvey'. His case in combination with that of Ato Belly provides the core empirical ground for further theorising subaltern mobility and networking in conflict situations.
'Marcus Garvey', networker and 'Nouchi'
Like Ato Belly, 'Marcus Garvey' took up arms again in the tragic finale of post-electoral conflict, .
Also like Ato Belly, "Marcus Garvey" saw himself very much as part of the so-called reserve pool or support base (base arrière) of the FDS, not by dispatching 'violent labour' or by accommodating its 'labourers' in barracks (as Ato Belly did) but by executing such violent labour 8. A reworked version of this paper will appear in Utas (2012) and expands on the phenomenon of "bigmanity" in the networking and performance of militia members in Cote d"Ivoire.
first as a combatant and later as the foreman (chef de dispositif) of a group engaged in security operations. In sum, both Ato and "Garvey" -hereafter without quotes -were Big Men of sorts, managing a network (gbôhi) of (ex-)combatants around them. Of both their networks nothing much is presently left: Ato's gbôhi has lost its leader (and in all probability most of its members), while Garvey's is entirely dispersed and reduced to a dozen friends trying to keep in touch by mobile phone.
In Having no proper job, no proper house, and no family in whose midst he resides, Garvey labels himself a 'Noussi'. Going against the standard spelling of 'Nouchi' which refers to a broad category of (juvenile) urban vagrants and their slang (Newell, 2009a , de Latour, 2001 ), Garvey employs an idiosyncratic etymology to stress the word's composition of the French morphemes: 'nous' (we) and "si" (if), while explaining that:
"We the unemployed, we the students who have diplomas but no jobs, we, children whom the street has given birth to without checking into the maternity hospital, it is us; if you Reading through the writings of "Marcus Garvey", it is difficult to miss the fact that, similar to many of his fellow combatants, the proximity to the army is the alpha and omega of his engagement with militias. In the first pages of his war journal, "Garvey" reports a short conversation with a friend which instantly made him volunteer for the patriotic battle. When informing his friend "Garvey" that an organisation was being set up in order to dispatch youngsters to the front lines, he explained its modus operandi as follows:
"You go, they train you, they drop you off on the battle front in order to fight alongside the FANCI (Ivorian regular army) and after the war, they put you in the army, at least those who survived." (Garvey, 2011: 7)
The plausibility of this causal link between militia membership and entry into the regular army, In all of these places militia members received extremely variable treatment -a puzzling alternation of being glorified and humiliated. They were nurtured and accommodated at one moment and starved and chased at gunpoint at the next. As we will see presently, a similar ambivalence was equally at play in the core signifier of the corps habillés: the dress which could connote dignity and righteousness as much as cowardice and travesty.
One of the central items of proximity between the corps habillés and patriotic militias was the outfit. Issues and anecdotes relating to the uniform or battle dress (treillis), including the shoulder marks (galons), the beret (beret), boots (rangers or rénaux), and the belt (ceinturon), crop up in almost any conversation with ex-combatants. This is also the case in Garvey's autobiography.
Merely four months after his arrival on the western front line, he reports that militia members of the nude pas-gym he promised his trainees would all 'be dressed'; yet several months later, just days before their deportation to Abidjan, he broke down in tears, admitting: "I have lied to you, you will not be dressed here" (Garvey, 2011: 21) . This strongly indicates that the militia's focus on uniforms is much more than a (juvenile) obsession with outward appearance. As we will see presently, apart from considering the uniform as indexing a potentially critical move qua social mobility, for its aficionados it also functioned as a marker of moral distinction.
As could be expected, the military leadership gave preference to its regular troops when it came to the distribution of battle dresses and equipment. Garvey reports on the frustration this sometimes caused among his fellow FLGO members but while explaining this he also provides us with some clues as to how this combines with a more general disdain about the FDS's (in)significance in maintaining public order in a front-line city like Guiglo. During the rainy season of 2003, he writes, "The policeman at his roadblock could sleep throughout, the gendarme commuted between the Mini Shop bar and his desk, while the soldier was busy managing his women's business when he wasn't attending to the roadblock." In order to measure the degree of Garvey's low esteem for all three categories of the corps habillés, it is important to know that not only drinking at the Mini Shop and flirting was considered to be of little profit for national security, but also hanging around the office, and even more so, occupying a roadblock was despised as a futile war-time activity.
10. The full song is "Donnez treillis oooh ça va finir (2x)" (Give us uniforms" oh it will finish), adding "han got the natty dread". The word 'dread' is an interesting contamination of dress (the expression 'natty dress') and dreadlock which together with the rest of the English 'got the' indicates the presence of Liberian fellow combatants (mercenaries as well as members of the LIMA militia) on the western front. Garvey could not explain the meaning of the word "han". This is also explained by Ato Belly (25/3/2009) who, in a long narrative about the day he decided to abandon his job as a taxi driver in order to "liberate his country", he insulted the policemen who approached him at the central junction (le grand carrefour) of Abidjan's important commune of Koumassi: "I told them: this country is dying and you are here busy racketeering along the road; one asks us to go and liberate Bouaké, you have the required arms but you use them to force taxis to stop". The fact that, as a taxi driver, Ato had been undergoing the racketeering-at-gunpoint of these police officers for many years, certainly added to his frustration and to the ferocity of his scolding. However, it is probably not so much the practice of roadside racketeering itself which
Ato took offence at -after all that was also one of the militias' favourite activities -, but the fact that the corps habillés' arrogance towards helpless citizens masked a proven lack of courage when it came to facing an armed adversary. This also was exemplified in the way the FDS dealt with their uniforms. Finally, uniforms were not only a way of distinguishing oneself from the non-uniformed civil servants and civilians, but also from different armed units, and most of all, from enemy troops.
Recounting his admission to the GPP, Ato explains that he feared confusion and infiltration when he observed that GPP militia members were dressed in the same way as the rebels he had seen on TV: wearing no proper boots (rangers) but plastic sandals (lèke), and merely uniform trousers and 
Subaltern mobility: going in circles?
The above detailed description of the complex and ambivalent relationship between the military and the militias through the prism of corps habillés, allows us to safely speculate that for militia members FDS uniforms and military gear were important markers of a prospective transition process which could lead into the heart of the corps habillés. Such a process starts, quite plainly, with a change of clothes, as described in graphic terms by the late GPP 'commander' Roger Njabehi (26/03/2009):
"because we were civilians, we had to put on a military uniform [...] in order to help the military [...] and the military were aware of that, and the gendarmes were also aware of that: that these kids there are helping us; so we are going to fight along with you, "dress them", and they have dressed us".
However, as we know now, with the exception of a few lucky ones, thousands have seen their military dreams unfulfilled until this day (Banégas, 2008) .
The magnitude of this disillusion is certainly proportional to the recursivity of the false promises expressed by many important political and military entrepreneurs, and at critical moments, echoed by the militia leaders themselves in a desperate attempt to keep their gbôhi mobilised and rallied behind them. However, the impact of these messages 'from above' must be completed by considering the tactics 'from below', for instance the sustained attempts by youngsters to insinuate themselves into the corps habillés in spite of the successive disillusions and even downright rejections over a period of many years. For many of the militia members, like for Ato Belly and Marcus Garvey, these disillusions repeated themselves over a period of eight long years and ended sometime in March 2011, in a decisive if not fatal bid to enter the corps habillés. By then the latter were perceived as stripped of the weak, the cowards and the imposters who, in an ultimate démasqué, had abandoned their battle dresses. The militia members' sticking to the uniforms in itself became a demonstration of their unabated loyalty and proof that they deserved what they had been asking for since day one: 'being dressed'.
In the remainder of this paper, I want to further explore the effects and, above all, the mechanisms of these tactics of impersonation within broader frames of apprenticeship, on-the-job training, and social mobility. As a starting point, it is important to be aware that the youngsters were somehow conscious of the fact that by putting on some military garb and hanging about in the vicinity of the corps habillés, they were playing a big game with all the ambiguity that came with it. Near the end of 2007, after yet another six months of waiting for the demobilisation and reintegration programme in Guiglo to resume, Garvey noted:
"I am 32 years old, it is true that without having served in the army, I have served in the army. I have frequented it so much that I can claim I was with it, this army, it is beautiful, impressive but hypocrite and treacherous. When I recall the words of Sergeant Koulaï
Roger I feel myself suffering, regretting. I still see him sobbing, telling us that he merely executed orders. That makes me feel like throwing up: to offer hopes of beauty and of strength, and shatter these in such a hypocritical way. In one word, I have walked alongside this beauty, this imposing and betraying hypocrite and I have come to detest it in the end." (Garvey, 2011) The central metaphor of this paragraph -companionship -provides some guidance for starting to devise an analytical framework for subaltern (social) mobility in-times-of-crisis. Garvey looks back on a trajectory in which he got entangled with the army, learned much about it, learned much of it, but never really became part of it, never fully inhabited the corps he so eagerly wanted to belong to. Instead, in phrases such as "I was with it" (my emphasis) Garvey positions himself as a (travel) companion of the army. This matches the general theme of his autobiography which he entitles 'The companion' and in which he addresses the reader throughout as 'my companion'.
Companionship has at least two strings of meanings which relate to social mobility and networking respectively. In the realm of social mobility, the companionship implies an enduring situation of initiation or apprenticeship without ever reaching full proficiency. Garvey sees himself lingering in a situation of truncated mastery which for some time constitutes a source of hope but eventually also of desperation. Equally so in the realm of networking, the enduring cotravelling produces 'company' in many forms albeit mainly of a rather ephemeral and cursory nature. The fellow companions of the army and corps habillés in their capacity as elder brothers have a large stake in regulating the see-saw movement of nearing (complicity) and distancing (subjugation) between the militia dilettantes and the properly 'dressed' FDS professionals.
Furthermore, militia members seek the company of friends or 'compagnons de route' and more often than not consider themselves belonging to a gbôhi. Although at certain times the gbôhi can be a strong locus of identification and solidarity, it has very permeable boundaries and is in constant flux as people join and leave. Finally, militia activity creates conduits to the bigger world of national politics, magistrature, and top-level administration. The web of military and political patronage surrounding the self-defence groups in Côte d'Ivoire of the preceding decade resulted both in occasional contacts and short or long-term contracts between members of both realms.
Having addressed Gbagbo directly in the course of a protest action was a source of pride for Marcus Garvey, as much as it was a source of prestige for Ato Belly to have met the army chief of staff Philippe Mangou on several occasions. More durable and lucrative were the special operations or long-term bodyguard contracts for politicians, judges, or top-level civil servants, which certain militia members were able to secure for themselves and their gbôhi. A good example of this was the two-month contract Ato Belly concluded with the Mauritanian ambassador in February 2011 in order for him and a dozen of his 'elements' to protect the embassy and the hundreds of Mauritanian refugees it accommodated at that time.
In all, the networking as much as the on-the-job training of militia apprenticeship, were rather shallow and elusive, and, for the large majority of the militia members, never resulted in full mastery, a stable professional or patronage network, or a far-reaching identification with the coveted corps habillés. Instead, the relationship with the latter largely boiled down to a fascination for what Garvey calls its "beauty and strength", that is, its outward appearance epitomised by the uniforms and paraphernalia, and its strength indexed by the fire arms and the direct impact of carrying weapons in public. Thus, in spite of their tenacity and dedication, militia members remained forever "outside" and hierarchically 'below' the army "corps" -enduringly peripheral and subaltern. Any further theorising should start from here.
Incrementalism, impersonation, and the field
Tens of thousands of youngsters who try to supplement the state's corps habillés, can be taken as
an instance of what AbdouMaliq Simone describes as 'incrementalism' (Simone, 2008a: 17) . In his usage, this refers to the gradual albeit sometimes rapid process of appendage in the construction of houses, markets and other urban infrastructures . When applied to institutional contexts such as the corps habillés, incrementalism alerts us the proliferation of "state"; what Aretxaga (2003: 369) identifies as "an excess of statehood practices: too many actors competing to perform as state".
This enables me to further develop the idea developed elsewhere (Arnaut and Højbjerg, 2008 , Hagmann and Péclard, 2010 , Menkhaus, 2008 that the absence of the state in Africa leaves voids that are filled in by entrepreneurs of different sorts. 'Incrementalism' does not start from possible voids but from the supplementing or multiplying operations in the vicinity of state institutions which may either condense and extend them or rather drain and trim them down. As one of
Hibou"s seminal texts on state transformation -in accord with founding texts such as that of Bayart (Bayart et al., 1999) and Reno (1995) -points out, the privatisation of the state does not simply concern its 'décharge' (discharge) but also its 'dédoublement' (duplication/multiplication) by way of the "intensive use of intermediaries" (Hibou, 1999: 13-14) . More recent studies in domains as diverse as administration (Blundo, 2006) and conflict transformation (Menkhaus, 2008 , Mehler, 2009 , Engel and Mehler, 2005 show the empirical potential of exploring this multiplication or refraction, resulting in the creation of vast terrains of hybrid state-related activity. These mediations take place within the networks described in the preceding sections of this paper and consist of gbôhi and militia structures with shifting degrees of formality as well as the patron networks that surround them. Central nodes in these hybrid, mediating structures are Big Men of different scale and weight who occupy equally ambivalent positions in transition zones between state and non-state activity.
In order to understand such zones of state mediation it is important not only to acknowledge the pull factors of state "décharge": formal (say World Bank or Washington-consensus guided) as well as informal privatisation. The obvious "push factors" of state mediation are youth unemployment or, more generally, lack of opportunities. This situation has been rightly identified as "social death" (Vigh, 2006) or "blockage" -as a lack of mobility and opportunities "to keep the options open" (Simone, 2008b) . The ( the diversion of labour time in government and commercial administrations as much as in factories -the militia activity of so many militant Ivorian youngsters during the past decade can best be understood as a sustained "act of camouflage, of counterfeit and make believe" aimed at insinuating themselves into the state and its institutions.
These provisional remarks on impersonation are meant to indicate that we are dealing with a particularly complex phenomenon which requires the kind of empirical and theoretical grounding which this paper is merely able to begin to provide. After all, we need to account for the reflexive dialectics involved in dressing up (from below) and being dressed up (from above), or more broadly, in the appropriation and registering of forms, types and postures which circulate within the urban, national and transnational Ivorian space -to the extent that, in themselves, these forms come to stand for circulation, (social) mobility and advancement in life. Any proper interpretation of impersonation as subaltern tactics, must avoid slipping into simplistic, supremacist, if not downright (neo)colonialist conceptions of subaltern mimicry (Apter, 1999 , and see Fabian, 2002 , Ferguson, 2002 .
The broader empirical grounding for juvenile impersonation in patriotic militantism and activism in Côte d"Ivoire, must be sought within popular culture and popular politics, which in the preceding decades had been vested in new a urban culture which has sometimes been labelled as "Nouchi" (see also : McGovern, 2011) . To describe the successful career of Nouchi in Ivorian public life over the last two decades is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to situate the expansion of Nouchi street culture in the period of fast urbanisation of the 1980s, and, most importantly, its take-up by the student "revolutionary" movements of the 1990s. This, in turn, led to the introduction of street culture and discourse into opposition politics, mainly in the hands of the leftist party FPI and its leader Laurent Gbagbo. And when the latter came to power in 2000, to its sedimentation in mainstream politics (Arnaut, 2008a , Arnaut, 2005 interesting is "the incorporation of deceitful illusion and illocutionary performance into economic transactions, gender roles, and claims to modernity" (Newell, 2009b: 384) . Very important for our purposes is the fact that in typical bluff settings none of the participants are completely fooled, but at most embezzled:
"It was at once based on the idea of deception and prestige of illusion, yet at the same time no one was fooled, the audience was aware of the hoax before the show even began. And yet, everyone acted as though the bluff were real."
In conclusion, Newell (2009b: 385) claims: "the audience"s awareness of fakery was irrelevant, it was the aptitude for artifice that earns respect and praise, and had transformative potential."
The politician who embodied this 'aptitude for artifice' most cogently was President Gbagbo, the Biggest Man in the country at the time, in his capacity as 'the baker' (le boulanger) who, according to the French expression to which this epithet refers, "rolls everyone in flour" (il roule tout le monde dans la farine), that is, takes everyone (his colleagues, his opponents as much as his electorate) for a ride. However, if streetwise bluffing is a youth competency, so are its political and activist variants. One of the most flagrant instances of juvenile political "bluff" was the so- propaganda (Bahi, 2001 : 159, Atchoua, 2008 .
A final example of juvenile activist 'bluffing' is that which took place on a grand scale in the urban militias and the southern youth militant groups in general. As we have seen, the simulations of "real" military life were manifold and pertained to matters of rank, outfit and attire, and, of course, activities. Among these the use of military titles by the GPP leadership was the most flagrant, since not only GPP members were meant to recognise them but also civilians and the FDS acknowledged them publicly, sometimes tongue-in-cheek and sometimes more seriouslydepending on the power balance at the moment of interaction (Arnaut, 2006) .
Lastly, in a recent paper Newell (2009a) invites us to situate impersonation and "bluff" in the very heart of Nouchi culture. Bluffing, he argues, as the appropriation of alterity is also central to the urban slang called Nouchi. Taking most of its lexical material from French, Nouchi also incorporates lexical material from English and a number of national languages such as Dyula, Baule, and Bété. By dethroning "metropolitan" French and venturing into trans-local and transnational linguistic terrains, Nouchi indexes urban cosmopolitism and modernity (idem). But there is more to it. Nouchi is in constant flux and its speakers take pride in using the latest new words or even try to introduce them themselves by transferring lexical material from other "languages" within their repertoires. This can be attested in Marcus Garvey"s autobiography in which he enriches "standard" Nouchi with expressions which he himself identifies as "military slang" or "builder"s idiom". Taken together, his repertoires index his "walks of life": the different sectors of society and professional activities which he straddles. In other words, his linguistic agility is a function of his (professional) flexibility, and, his potential social mobility. Taking our lead from Mbembe (1992, Mbembe and Roitman, 1997) who saw the multiplication of identities as a performative tactics in what he calls the postcolony, the impersonating behaviour of Ivorian youngsters can be seen as an attempt to insinuate themselves in different spheres of activity in order "to keep the options open" (Simone, 2008a , Simone, 2008b . The ultimate task, which this paper can merely initiate, is to conceptualise this.
The theoretical frame of the topography and performativity of the kind of juvenile impersonation observed above, consists of three related analytical concepts: articulation, navigation, and fields.
Taking her lead from Gramsci and Hall, Tania Li (2007: 22) looks at identification as well as the social practice of 'political subjects' in terms of articulation, that is, "the multiple positions that people occupy, and the diverse powers they encounter." For research purposes, articulation "points rather to the necessity of teasing out, historically and ethnographically, the various ways in which room for manoeuvre is present but never unconstrained." (Li, 2000: 153) . Navigation, as used by Vigh (2008) and Utas (2005, Utas and Jörgel, 2008) , partly based on Honwana (2000: 77-78) and
De Certeau (De Certeau, 1984) , is precisely conceived in order to account for this 'room for manoeuvre'. Situations of crisis, according to Vigh (2008: 18) "force agents to take into account not only how they are able to move within a social environment, but also how the social environment moves them, and other agents within it, as they seek to traverse envisioned trajectories." Navigation implies a dialogical relationship between actors and their social environments, hence some more attention needs to be given to the actual constitution of the terrain on which it takes place. Between overstressing stability and predictability and merely characterising actors' mobility as "motion within motion", an intermediate position seems possible which acknowledges that flow and fixity constitute each other as much as mobility rests upon structures of immobility (Lien and Melhuus, 2007: ix, Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002) . In order to make this into more than a truism, we need some concept of 'field' without -and here I agree with Vigh -adopting the rather heavy and static concept Bourdieu made of it. Instead, our analyses of tactical agency may profit from a rather open, dynamical notion of field which helps to identify and map 'terrains' in terms of the stakes and opportunities they contain, the competencies they value and the expectation they nourish. Taken as such a field largely corresponds with Turner"s definition of it as "an ensemble of relationships between actors antagonistically oriented toward the same prizes or values (in this case control over the state apparatus)" (Turner, 1974: 135) . The dynamical and open nature of such a field allows, above all, to register how these fields alter through the incursions of 'navigating' actors -as well as other external interventions (Martin, 2003) . As far as the identification of fields is concerned, contemporary field theory allows us to define fields rather loosely and according to specific analytical needs, more or less as 'spheres of activity' or 'registers of social action' in the Weberian sense (Lahire, 1999) even related to particular social networks (Breiger, 2004) . In this paper I have focused mainly on the corps habillés as a field and ventured into interrelated fields such as popular culture, media, and popular politics.
Afterthoughts in lieu of a conclusion
The first months of the new Ouattara administration has witnessed a series of far-reaching and Ivorian Rap. The destruction of these sites of popular culture and popular politics makes us realise the extent to which over the last decade public life, at least the pro-Gbagbo part of it, they had been flourishing in a novel and vigorous human infrastructure and built environment. Two items of this public culture -generally labelled "Nouchi" -which rose to prominence and proliferated in many different guises in this milieu, were gbôhi and "bluff".
In this paper, "bluff" was presented as a key performative tactics in a broader politics of impersonation of subaltern urbanites concerned with their ever threatened social mobility. In the hands of the thousands of members of patriotic youth militias, "bluffing" had the corps habillés as its target and took the form of a tenacious and sometimes fatal, impersonation of military postures, discourse and practices. The cases of Ato Belly, but above all of Marcus Garvey demonstrate how unrewarding this politics of impersonation was and how it merely resulted in a state of enduring apprenticeship without full mastery or ongoing "companionship" without properly "joining in".
The latter observations bring us to the gbôhi, the second important item of urban public life which flourished during the Gbagbo era. Gbôhi thrived in Nouchi in the years since 2000 as a new term for "gang" derived from the Dyula term for "house", "gbo". Simultaneously, it was adopted in militia circles as the key-term for referring to the intricate process of networking: the fission and fusion of groups and "groupuscules", the continuous fragmenting and merging of formal selfdefence groups as well as the formation and disintegration of smaller factions, of bands of friends, and of ad hoc squads of youth militia members offering their "violent labour" to state and nonstate actors. The cases of Marcus Garvey and Ato Belly not only illustrate the vibrancy of networking but also revealed the double dynamics of subaltern "big-manity" involved in this: the search of groups for leadership and patronage as well as the quest of different types of leaders to gather and coach "elements", merge factions, and federate militia groups.
By choosing to approach the problematic of networks in conflict situations within a perspective of impersonation and social mobility, I have tried to bring out both the geographical and historical specificity of militia-formation in the Ivoirian conflict of the preceding decade and its universality in terms of juvenile subalternity and postcolonial urbanity.
